Global Climate Policy: A Policy Evaluation of Public Good Games
The Failure of the latest International Agreements on Climate Change has shown the hardness to
keep and preserve stability in coalitions made on differently orientated Countries.
Since there are no international authorities who can enforce the agreement, the task of the present
study is to assess the Paris Agreement in both its aspired effectiveness of its targets and in its stability and self-enforceability by confronting the Paris Coalition design with a game-theoretical outcome.
In order to do so, we proceed by applying the econometric methods of Almer and Winkler (JEEM, 2017) and Abadie et al. (J. Am. Stat. Assoc., 2010) to project carbon dioxide emissions for 2020 and 2030.
Then, we assess the submitted Intended Nationally Determined Commitments of the Paris Agreement against the probability density functions of our forecasts.
Finally, we insert a game-theoretical evaluation of the Agreement by applying the methods of Murdoch and Sandler (JPubE, 1997) to assess whether or not the aspired emission reduction is a voluntary contribution to the public good. We then derive the marginal costs of emission reduction from the econometric model to test whether Paris is a cooperative or a non-cooperative agreement.