We analyse the Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in order to account for their uneven distribution among the European Union countries and to identify the motivations of the public actor in selecting PPPs. We focus on the fiscal incentives to overcome budget and borrowing constraints, taking into account the political features and institutional frameworks of the countries.
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are presented as means to introduce efficient procurement methods and better value for money to taxpayers. However, the complexity of the PPP mechanism, the lack of transparency, accounting rules and implicit liabilities make it often impossible to perceive the amount of public expenditure involved and the long-run impact on taxpayers, providing room for fiscal illusion, i.e., the illusion that PPPs are much less expensive than traditional public investments.
© Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" - Piazzale Aldo Moro 5, 00185 Roma
