Ricerc@Sapienza

The interdependency of multiple networks makes today's infrastructures more vulnerable to failures. Prior works mainly focused on robust network design and recovery strategies after failures, given complete knowledge of failure location. Nevertheless, in real-world scenarios, the location of failures might be unknown or only partially known. In this work, we focus on cascading failures involving the power grid and its communication network with imprecision in failure assessment.

Software vulnerabilities represent one of the main weaknesses of an Information Technology (IT) system w.r.t. cyber attacks and nowadays consolidated official data, like the Common Vulnerability Exposure (CVE) dictionary, provide precise and reliable details about them. This information, together with the identification of priority systems to defend allows for inspecting the network structure and the most probable paths an attacker is likely to follow to reach sensible resources, with the main goal of identify suitable mitigation actions that reduce the risk of an attack.