Little is known about the interactions of families where there is a child with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The present study applies the Lausanne Trilogue Play (LTP) to explore both its applicability to this population as well as to assess resources and areas of deficit in these families. The sample consisted of 68 families with a child with ASD, and 43 families with a typically developing (TD) child.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship that Karl Löwith had with Herman Cohen’s thought, examining its development from a historical and theoretical point of view. This confrontation proves fruitful both for a reconstruction of Löwithian philosophy and to gain – through the eyes of one of its interpreters – new perspectives for an understanding of the work of the Marburg school’s founder.
It is well known, that the in text On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy Kant holds that lying is always morally wrong. In this essay I try to demonstrate the paradoxical thesis that it is possible and maybe even necessary to contest this view by arguing exactly from the main premises of Kantʼs moral philosophy: In Kantian terms, the thesis of the text On a Supposed Right… is false. The so-called Kantian formalism relies on the criterium of the universalization of the maxim, but this criterium implies the need to always consider circumstances.
In this paper I would like to situate Michel Henry’s position within the context of the phenomenological debate on inter-subjectivity. By distinguishing an apriori and an a posteriori approach to inter-subjectivity, I will try to demonstrate that Henry adopts the first solution. From this vantage point, Henry’s pathos-avec appears to be much more closer to the notion of ‘Mit-sein ’, than his harsh criticism against Heidegger would suggests – which exposes Henry’s position to all the difficulties of the a priori model in general and of that of Heidegger in particular.
In the natural attitude, and in the ordinary language, religion is strictly bound to transcendence.
In this paper I ask whether the concept of “transcendence” is legitimate in the phenomenological
dimension, which is opened by the methodological operation of reduction
to the immanence of transcendental consciousness. By examining how “transcendence”
gains increasingly importance in Husserl’s thought, the necessity emerges to distinguish
three levels of it: intentional (or horizontal) transcendence, intersubjective transcendence
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