Ricerc@Sapienza

The article aims to show how the notions of «self-reflexivity» and «epistemic responsibility» could make sense of the limits characterizing our reading of others and of their needs, in the perspective of an ethics of care. These notions are understood through reference to Miranda Fricker, bell hooks and Iris Murdoch. We show that, in their own ways, all three authors propose a thought of the limits of our understanding of others, where these limits are considered as tied to our way of conceiving ourselves.

Il saggio offre una tassonomia in cui si distinguono quattro concetti di responsabilità: consequenzialistica, deontologica, ontologica e relazionale. Ognuno di essi mostra un aspetto importante di questo concetto.

The article aims to explore Iris Murdoch’s perspective on the relationship between philosophical reflection and moral experience. This relationship is considered with reference to the idea of the «loss of concepts», in order to show how Murdoch sheds light on issues involved in philosophical conceptions of the moral life, such as the possibility to make ordinary experiences intelligible or unintelligible. Murdoch’s perspective is analysed, on the one hand, in relation to philosophical method and, on the other hand, considering the kind of cultural criticism she elaborates.