Ricerc@Sapienza

This chapter sheds light on how the internationalization of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) is jointly influenced by the ownership involvement of the state and
other relational investors and by the home country’s institutional setting. It
integrates international business literature and insights from the theory of
corporate governance into a varieties of capitalism framework. Taking a configurational
perspective, the interdependencies that link the SOE internationalization
to the joint effects of particular combinations of actors and institutions

Research Summary: We investigate when and how a foreign multinational enterprise by acting as a relational co-owner helps the internationalization of hybrid state-owned enterprises. We merge the “liability of stateness” and the “government as strategist” perspectives with an institutional context-based approach. We claim that the effect of multinational enterprise relational co-ownership is contingent on the countries' institutional settings. It is positive at lower levels of both institutional coordination (as a measure of variety of capitalism) and government effectiveness.

The issue of whether foreign-owned firms (FOFs) are more likely to exit the market than domestic firms (DOMFs) is highly debated in the political as well as in the academic field. The “footloose” character of multinational enterprises is justified by the fact that, as part of an international production network, these firms can easily relocate production between countries in response to adverse shocks in the host country or to changes in local costs. Through the optimal portfolio theory U.S.