Power analysis attack

Fully integrable current-mode feedback suppressor as an analog countermeasure against CPA attacks in 40nm CMOS technology

Security of sensible data for ultraconstrained IoT smart devices is one of the most challenging task in modern design. The needs of CPA-resistant cryptographic devices has to deal with the demanding requirements of small area and small impact on the overall power consumption. In this work, a novel current-mode feedback suppressor as on-chip analog-level CPA countermeasure is proposed. It aims to suppress differences in power consumption due to data-dependency of CMOS cryptographic devices, in order to counteract CPA attacks.

Multivariate Analysis Exploiting Static Power on Nanoscale CMOS Circuits for Cryptographic Applications

Latest nanometer CMOS technology nodes have highlighted new issues in security of cryptographic hardware implementations. The constant growth of the static power consumption has led to a new class of side-channel attacks. Common attacks exploiting static power use an univariate approach to recover information from cryptographic engines. In our work, a multivariate approach based on information theoretic security metrics is presented. The temperature-dependence helps to exploit more information leakage from the hardware implementation.

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