Ricerc@Sapienza

Deficit in planning and problem-solving, affecting a wide range of neuropsychological patients, has been widely investigated using the Tower of London (ToL) test, as developed by Shallice (Philos Trans R Soc Lond Ser B Biol Sci 298:199-209, 1). The ToL taps on several executive functions (EF), such as planning, time for planning or rule breaks, which may be usefully indexed by different ToL measurements.

In this paper I lay out a non-formal kernel for a heuristic logic—a set of rational procedures for scientific discovery and ampliative reasoning—specifically, the rules that govern how we generate hypotheses to solve problems. To this end, first I outline the reasons for a heuristic logic (Sect. 1) and then I discuss the theoretical framework needed to back it (Sect. 2). I examine the methodological machinery of a heuristic logic (Sect. 3), and the meaning of notions like ‘logic’, ‘rule’, and ‘method’. Then I offer a characterization of a heuristic logic (Sect.

Theory-building is the engine of the scientific enterprise and it entails (1) the generation of new hypotheses, (2) their justification, and (3) their selection, as well as collecting data. The orthodox views maintain that there is a clear logical and temporal order, and distinction, between these three stages. As a matter of fact, not only is this tenet defective, but also there is no way to solve these three issues in the way advocated by traditional philosophy of science.