side channel attack

Fully integrable current-mode feedback suppressor as an analog countermeasure against CPA attacks in 40nm CMOS technology

Security of sensible data for ultraconstrained IoT smart devices is one of the most challenging task in modern design. The needs of CPA-resistant cryptographic devices has to deal with the demanding requirements of small area and small impact on the overall power consumption. In this work, a novel current-mode feedback suppressor as on-chip analog-level CPA countermeasure is proposed. It aims to suppress differences in power consumption due to data-dependency of CMOS cryptographic devices, in order to counteract CPA attacks.

Novel measurements setup for attacks exploiting static power using DC pico-ammeter

The static power consumption in modern integrated circuits has become a critical standpoint in side-channel analysis. As it has been widely demonstrated in the technical literature, it is possible to extract secret information from a cryptographic circuit by means of static current measurements. Static and dynamic power analysis require different measurement procedures, due to physical reasons.

© Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" - Piazzale Aldo Moro 5, 00185 Roma