Ricerc@Sapienza

Empirical social network studies on small groups usually aim to identify structural properties that correlate with performance on specific tasks. In recent decades, behavioral economics have shown that, in certain circumstances, individuals can be, in a specific sense, irrational, behaving in predictable ways that don’t maximize their self-interest. One of these circumstances is high stakes - the presence of high level incentives. In fact, it has been demonstrated that in tasks requiring cognitive abilities, large rewards tend to reduce individuals’ performance.

The identification and engagement of stakeholders is a challenge whose outcomes have a strong impact on a project’s success. This is even more relevant when the project concerns the introduction of sustainable technologies; these technologies are often less competitive on the market than traditional ones, both in terms of development complexity and production costs. This paper presents a stakeholder identification and mapping procedure, based on an Interest x Influence model, that emphasizes a quantitative methodological approach.

The purpose of the present paper is twofold. The first is to update the contribution by Drago et al. (2011) about cross-shareholdings and interlocking directorates in Italian listed companies (FTSE MIB) to 31 December 2016 and to reinforce theory of enlarged collusion. The second is to find how interlocking directorates can contribute to understanding the power structure.