Platon sur ΟΝΟΜΑ, ΡΗΜΑ et ΛΟΓΟΣ : théories du ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙΝ en Sophiste 261d-262e
In this article I examine Plato’s conception of λόγος, as a significant sequence (συνέχεια) of ὄνομα
and ῥῆμα, with a detailed commentary of Sophist 261d-262e. I particularly discuss the following
points: 1. Why the linguistic terms, in the case of a sequence of nouns or of a sequence of verbs,
do not indicate any action or any absence of action (οὐδεμίαν ... πρᾶξιν οὐδ᾽ πραξίαν), any
reality that is or any reality that is not (οὐδὲ οὐσίαν ὅντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος, 262c2-4) ? 2. What is