Ricerc@Sapienza

In this article I examine Plato’s conception of λόγος, as a significant sequence (συνέχεια) of ὄνομα
and ῥῆμα, with a detailed commentary of Sophist 261d-262e. I particularly discuss the following
points: 1. Why the linguistic terms, in the case of a sequence of nouns or of a sequence of verbs,
do not indicate any action or any absence of action (οὐδεμίαν ... πρᾶξιν οὐδ᾽  πραξίαν), any
reality that is or any reality that is not (οὐδὲ οὐσίαν ὅντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος, 262c2-4) ? 2. What is
the difference between “naming” (ὀνομάζειν) and “saying” (λέγειν) in 262d4-6 ? 3. What is the
difference between the constructions: λόγος περὶ + genitive and λόγος + genitive in 262e-263a ? 4.
More generally: is the truth criterion of λόγος established in 263b-d valid, retrospectively, for
every form of σημαίνειν, including the ὀνομάζειν ?