Ricerc@Sapienza

Obiettivi del paper: Il lavoro analizza e interpreta lo shareholder engagement quale strumento di co-creazione del valore e intende verificare se quest’ultimo possa favorire una maggiore circolazione delle informazioni all’interno dell’impresa, creando le premesse per un governo condiviso. Metodologia: Dato il carattere esplorativo dello studio, ci si è avvalsi di un approccio fenomenologico. Nel lavoro si utilizza un campione relativo al 44% di società italiane a larga e media capitalizzazione.

The literature on corprorate governance usually distinguishes between two types of ownership structures - diffuse and concentred - that reflect the contrast between the Anglo-American shareholder system and the continental European/japanese stakeholder system. Scholars have used these contrasting models to explain differences in finance, ownership, labour relations and the role of the market for corporate control among the varieties of capitalism.

Purpose of the paper: Recent research identifies a troubling number of institutional investors that automatically follow the advice of their proxy advisors so that they can prove to have complied with their fiduciary duties in a practice known as robo-voting. Therefore, our central research questions are: How could the characteristics of institutional investors affect robo-voting phenomenon? How could robo-voting phenomenon favour the creation of new opportunistic behaviour, changing the scope of shareholder engagement?