Absorption, the ability to highly focus attention, as well as openness to self-altering experiences, is an important psychological construct, closely related to deep-meditation states and other altered states of consciousness. Yet, little is known about the electrophysiological profile of states of absorption, possibly due to the difficulty to induce this state in the lab.
The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness is central to debates about consciousness and its neural correlates. However, this distinction has often been limited to the domain of perceptual (visual) experiences. On the basis of dream phenomenology and neuroscientific findings this paper suggests a theoretical framework which extends this distinction to dreaming, also in terms of plausible neural correlates.
The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has been influential in the field of consciousness studies. Both Block and Lamme proposed that access consciousness, or narrow cognitive accessibility, is related to a limited capacity working memory, and that phenomenal consciousness, or broad cognitive accessibility, is related to iconic memory or, more recently, to a fragile (intermediate) short-term memory store with a larger capacity than working memory.
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