Ricerc@Sapienza

It is a fact that the varied philosophical movement that goes under the name of “phenomenology” has broadly accepted in its own field of inquiry a whole family of issues, all converging on a virtual blaze that can be defined, by first approximation, with the generic and all-encompassing noun “religion”. The paradigmatic example of an “ontological-regional” approach is Max Scheler's phenomenology of religion.

The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness is central to debates about consciousness and its neural correlates. However, this distinction has often been limited to the domain of perceptual (visual) experiences. On the basis of dream phenomenology and neuroscientific findings this paper suggests a theoretical framework which extends this distinction to dreaming, also in terms of plausible neural correlates.

An apparently paradoxical tendency in contemporary Philosophy of Religion consists in no longer seeking transcendence starting with invisible and immaterial elements, such as the soul, the spirit, or God known to reason. Instead a bridge between philosophy and theology has been singled out in the body. ”ut how can one reach an idea of transcendence starting from the body? In these short reflections, I will try to show how finitude and immanence are the phenomenological meaning of the body. Consciousness itself is finite because it is embodied. So it is not possible to transcend the body.

Dans ce qu’on pourrait considérer comme sa première confrontation articulée avec l’histoire de la pensée, le cours du 1923-1924 consacré à la Erste Philosophie, Husserl présente la phénoménologie comme le résultat du long processus de recherche du fondement propre à la philosophie. Dans cette évolution, « ontogenèse » et « phylogenèse » phénoménologiques semblent procéder en parallèle : la réduction eidétique et la réduction transcendantale sont associées aux deux figures que Husserl décrit comme fondamentales, à savoir Platon et Descartes.

This paper aims to root the question of nihilism in a lived experience. By examining the (almost hidden) presence of Qoehlet in contemporary phenomenology it is possible to find in boredom the actual Erlebnis of meaninglessness and to bring out its fundamental methodological function. This implies a criticism of Heidegger’s privilege of Angst, which appears to be lacking in phenomenological concreteness.

The turn of the twentieth century witnessed the birth of two distinct philosophical schools in Europe: Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. The history of twentiethcentury philosophy is often written as an account of the development of one or both