Ricerc@Sapienza

In this article I examine Plato’s conception of λόγος, as a significant sequence (συνέχεια) of ὄνομα
and ῥῆμα, with a detailed commentary of Sophist 261d-262e. I particularly discuss the following
points: 1. Why the linguistic terms, in the case of a sequence of nouns or of a sequence of verbs,
do not indicate any action or any absence of action (οὐδεμίαν ... πρᾶξιν οὐδ᾽  πραξίαν), any
reality that is or any reality that is not (οὐδὲ οὐσίαν ὅντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος, 262c2-4) ? 2. What is

In this article, I wish to present and discuss some Heideggerian theses concerning the notions of “being,” “presence” and “truth” in Plato’s dialogues, taking as a point of departure Heidegger’s course on Plato’s Sophist given in Marburg in 1924–1925. My aim is to show that the fundamental philosophical link that unites them makes it possible to better understand seemingly obscure aspects of the Platonic conception of being and knowledge as it is presented in particular in the concluding pages of Republic V (476e–479e), to which this article is therefore essentially devoted.

Following the different opinions of the Fathers of the Reformation on the question of the unity of the truth, many discussions on this topic can be found in the early protestant orthodoxy. This contribution focuses on two chapters of this post-history: the well-known quarrel on the thesis of Daniel Hofmann at the University of Helmstedt and the maybe less-known thesis of the philosophical school of Altdorf (Scherb and Piccart).