Ricerc@Sapienza

The work aims to illustrate the important evolution suffered by the discipline of non-pecuniary damage by the Constitutional Court and theCourt of Cassation in the Italian legal system. The essay aims to clarifythe path that led from the initial interpretation to the current, througha reading oriented to the constitution of the provision of the law of art.2059 c.c. Originally, the nonpecuniary damage referred only to thesubjective moral damage (that is to say, to the anguish of the victim),it was only compensable in the cases of extracontractual responsibility and only in the cases in which the illicit act constituted, also, a crime.Nowadays, moral damage refers to any prejudice for the damage ofexistential interests; it is compensable both in cases of non-contractualliability and in cases of contractual liability; it is repairable in any casein which there is a violation of a constitutionally protected interest. Finally, A. proposes a solution aimed at further expanding the compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the human person in allcases in which it is “unjust”, and moves away from the relief that suchinjustice can only lead to the violation of the fundamental normativevalue of the Italian legal system.