Aristotle on science as problem solving
The paper provides an interpretation of Aristotle’s view on scientific inquiry as problem solving. It tackles passages where
Aristotle emphasises the role that the problem-solving activity has in science, and where he describes the history of humans’
problem-solving activity and the historical development of natural science as a problem-solving activity. Further, the paper
examines Aristotle’s practice of raising, assessing and solving problems as well as the heuristic procedures he employs to
move from ignorance to scientific knowledge. Finally, it raises a question about Aristotle’s view on the epistemic status of
scientific definitions: does Aristotle conceive of the definitions, which are the results of scientific inquiries, as truths (known
with certainty to be true, i.e. known with certainty to be principles) or rather as plausible hypotheses that may or may not
be true?