Ricerc@Sapienza

In this article, I try to propose some reflections about the nature and status of the intelligible
in the Timaeus, particularly with respect to its features of a properly being and
above all vital reality. The attribution of “life” and “vitality” to the intelligible certainly
has an analogical character, that is, it depends on the consideration of the sensible:
since the cosmos is a sensible living being and is a copy of an intelligible model, then
the intelligible model must be configured as an intelligible living being. Now, to be
“living”, for a sensible reality, means to have a soul that animates a body, that is a soul
which is embodied; but this seems to apply only in the case of the sensible. What does
it mean, then, and what does it entail, to be “living” for an intelligible reality? Some
interpretative hypotheses on this point are examined here and a possible overall explanation
is suggested.