Ricerc@Sapienza

Dans certains articles (112 et suivants) des Passions de l’âme, Descartes définissait déjà les expressions corporelles des passions comme des
« signes », encadrant ainsi déjà la question dans un horizon sémiotique. Le choix se retrouve aussi chez Kant, qui emploie, pour envisager la
question, le terme de caractéristique anthropologique. La thèse que nous voulons soutenir ici est que chez Descartes, mais surtout chez Kant

In this essay I would like to introduce three possible models for dealing philosophically with a theological-religious object. These three models are illustrated by three concepts, namely, analogy, paradox and dispositive. However, the three models also correspond to approaches of three disciplines, namely natural theology, philosophy of religion and political theology. What is usually called «philosophy of religion» is in fact stricto sensu only a historically determined way of philosophically exploring transcendence.

Philosophical papers on history and philosophy of scepticism.

Introductory Remarks to the volume: The « and » in Franz Rosenzweig’s work : connection, disjunction, contrariety

Dans ce qu’on pourrait considérer comme sa première confrontation articulée avec l’histoire de la pensée, le cours du 1923-1924 consacré à la Erste Philosophie, Husserl présente la phénoménologie comme le résultat du long processus de recherche du fondement propre à la philosophie. Dans cette évolution, « ontogenèse » et « phylogenèse » phénoménologiques semblent procéder en parallèle : la réduction eidétique et la réduction transcendantale sont associées aux deux figures que Husserl décrit comme fondamentales, à savoir Platon et Descartes.

The current issue of Archivio di filosofia/Archives of Philosophy is devoted to the very peculiar logics and dialectics involved by a little – but decisive – word in FranzRosenzweig’s work : the word « and ». Despite its apparent lack of content, this conjunction is full of meaning and can even be described as a core term in Rosenzweig’s «NewThinking ». Indeed, it is exactly the « and » that allows – according to Rosenzweig – to avoid the monism which is typical of idealistic philosophy, from Ionia to Jena, from Thales to Hegel.

Kants Schrift zur Anthropologie von 1798 beginnt mit einer Unterscheidung zwischen einer Anthropologie „in physiologischer Hinsicht“ und einer Anthropologie „in pragmatischer Hinsicht“. Über diese Zweiteilung in pragmatischer und physiologischer Anthropologie hinaus taucht in Kants Werk jedoch, wenn auch nur ganz am Rande, eine andere mögliche Art von Anthropologie auf.

In a reflection forming part of Kant’s Handschriftlicher Nachlass that has been traced back by Adickes to the years between 1776 and 1778 there occurs a phrase which occurs nowhere else in the entire body of Kant’s works: “transcendental anthropology” (anthropologia transcendentalis, no. 903 in AA XV, 395).In this passage Kant places in close relation with one another the “common sense” represented by the “point of view of all other human beings” and the self-knowledge of intellect and reason.

In a reflection forming part of Kant’s Handschriftlicher Nachlass that has been traced back by Adickes to the years between 1776 and 1778 there occurs a phrase which occurs nowhere else in the entire body of Kant’s works: “transcendental anthropology” (anthropologia transcendentalis, no. 903 in AA XV, 395). Every scholar and scientist, Kant maintains here, must take care to avoid becoming a “cyclops”, that is to say, someone who observes the phenomena that concern him with, as it were, a “single eye”.

Somatology is an ‘invention’ of early modern Protestant Scholasticism and is mentioned by Immanuel Kant. Consistently with the way in which this discipline was considered in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, somatology is for Kant the discipline that has to do with material physical objects and therefore with ‘bodies’ conceived in a broader sense. But somatology is also for him the counterpart of pneumatology or psychology, as sciences dealing with the spirits of the soul.