Ricerc@Sapienza

Dans le cadre de ce texte, nous avons l’intention d’exposer trois modèles possibles pour le traitement philosophique de la question du sens et du non-sens de la transcendance. Ces trois modèles sont illustrés par trois concepts : analogie, paradoxe et dispositif. Mais ces trois modèles peuvent aussi être mis en relation avec trois approches disciplinaires : théologie naturelle, philosophie de la religion et théologie politique.

In this essay I would like to introduce three possible models for dealing philosophically with a theological-religious object. These three models are illustrated by three concepts, namely, analogy, paradox and dispositive. However, the three models also correspond to approaches of three disciplines, namely natural theology, philosophy of religion and political theology. What is usually called «philosophy of religion» is in fact stricto sensu only a historically determined way of philosophically exploring transcendence.

Introductory Remarks to the volume: The « and » in Franz Rosenzweig’s work : connection, disjunction, contrariety

An apparently paradoxical tendency in contemporary Philosophy of Religion consists in no longer seeking transcendence starting with invisible and immaterial elements, such as the soul, the spirit, or God known to reason. Instead a bridge between philosophy and theology has been singled out in the body. ”ut how can one reach an idea of transcendence starting from the body? In these short reflections, I will try to show how finitude and immanence are the phenomenological meaning of the body. Consciousness itself is finite because it is embodied. So it is not possible to transcend the body.

The current issue of Archivio di filosofia/Archives of Philosophy is devoted to the very peculiar logics and dialectics involved by a little – but decisive – word in FranzRosenzweig’s work : the word « and ». Despite its apparent lack of content, this conjunction is full of meaning and can even be described as a core term in Rosenzweig’s «NewThinking ». Indeed, it is exactly the « and » that allows – according to Rosenzweig – to avoid the monism which is typical of idealistic philosophy, from Ionia to Jena, from Thales to Hegel.

La tesi espressa dal titolo di questo contributo sembra porsi in esplicita contraddizione con la tradizione del pensiero religioso in generale, cristiano in particolare e forse per alcuni aspetti soprattutto cattolico, secondo cui si è veramente liberi, si guadagna piena libertà, nel momento in cui si àncora la libertà stessa a Dio. È Dio infatti, e solo Lui, ad essere vera e piena libertà. Non nell’indipendenza da Dio, dunque, ma, al contrario, nel legame e nell’unione con con lui, si raggiunge la libertà.

Commentario analitico dei paragrafi indicati della "Critica della capacità di giudizio", letti con attenzione particolare alla questione del "sommo bene"